The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review

Akron Law Journals

August 2015

Executive Privilege: A Review of Berger
R. H. Clark

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
Clark, R. H. (1975) "Executive Privilege: A Review of Berger," Akron Law Review: Vol. 8 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

Clark: Executive Privilege: A Review of Berger

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
A REVIEW OF BERGERt
R. H. CLARK*
RAOUL BERGER HAS ONCE AGAIN placed within a solidly professional
framework an issue of considerable public interest and debate. As
was the case with impeachment,' Berger's scholarly study on executive
privilege brings to the controversy surrounding the issue a much needed
analytical construct and massing of evidence which can only result in a
greater level of general understanding. Although it is not accurate to
suggest that Berger is neutral on the topic, since he published a significant
study as far back as 1965 attacking the concept, 2 his method of massing
every conceivable argument and piece of evidence on both sides of the
issue makes this work the most valuable treatment of executive privilege
available. As was the case with his previous volumes, the framework of
analysis employed by Berger stresses extensive historical study of both
English and American sources. This, in turn, is combined with an effective
and detailed dissection of 'the legal bases for presidential power and with
a complete examination of the origins, growth and dimensions of executive
privilege. While this reviewer disagrees with the central position that
Berger asserts, namely that executive privilege is a myth, this disagreement
in no way should be interpreted as seeking to deride this monument to
scholarly research and analysis that Berger has produced.
One of the most surprising aspects of executive privilege is how
recently the doctrine has become significant. In fact, the term itself,
Berger relates, was only coined in 1958.3 The major impetus that raised
the concept to a position of importance was the abusive use of the
congressional investigatory power manifested during the tragic efforts to
search out and expose the "Communist conspiracy" during the late 1940's
and early 1950's. 4 Particularly significant were the unrestrained uses to
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Denison University; A.B., University of
California, Riverside; M.A., Ph.D., University of California, Santa Barbara.
t EXEtCUTIV PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH. By RAOUL BERGER. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1974. Pp. 425.
1 See his significant study, R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

(1973). This reviewer's analysis of the volume can be found at Clark, Book Review,
35 OHIo ST. L.J. 92 (1974).
2 Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1043,
1287 (1965).
3 R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 1 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as BERaGE]. The reviewer has, however, found the term used as early as 1955.
See T. TAYLOR, GRwD INQUEST: TE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 97
(1955).
4 One of the principal perpetrators of this "exposure for exposure's sake" strategy was
the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities. See generally W. GOODMAN, THm
COMMITTEE (1968).
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which the late Senator Joseph McCarthy put the investigative power in
his never ending quest for publicity. President Eisenhower turned to
the doctrine of executive privilege in order to safeguard the innermost
workings of the executive branch from this boundless congressional
probing. As a result, the doctrine became strongly entrenched as a
recourse for Presidents long after 'the threat of McCarthyist investigations
had passed. Congressional investigations emerged from this period with a
permanent badge of suspicion in the eyes of the public; this legacy of
distrust has been frequently exploited by Presidents seeking to justify their
unwillingness to disclose requested information. 5 Since the 1950's the
doctrine, which previously had been asserted only sporadically, became
notable for its frequent invocation.6 This trend reached its ultimate limits
during the Presidency of Richard M. Nixon, where it was asserted that
the President had virtually unchecked discretion to block disclosure of
any information related to the executive branch which the President
believed contrary to the public interest. 7
Berger devotes an early chapter to outlining the origins and
justifications for a largely unrestrained congressional power to investigate
executive conduct. First, he traces English Parliamentary history which
clearly establishes that a broad power to investigate existed as early as
1621. At this stage, the authority to investigate was closely tied to the
power of impeachment. Close scrutiny of historical sources indicates that
investigations into the Crown's conduct of war, the expenditure of public
funds, execution of the laws, and investigations as an adjunct to framing
legislation were firmly established. There was certainly no apparent
exceptions made for foreign affairs. The central purpose of these early
investigations was to insure the accountability of the executive. Berger
S One book that has done much to perpetuate this distrust of congressional investigations is A. BARTH, GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION (1955).
6 The historical evolution of the doctrine of executive privilege is found in Wolkinson,
Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, 10 FED. BAR J. 103, 223,
319 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Wolkinson], covering the period through 1948;
MEMORANDUMS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO
WITHHOLD INFORMATION FROM CONGRESS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITrEE ON CONSTITU-

TIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDIcIARY, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
83-166 (1959), dealing with the period between 1948-1953; Kramer & Marcuse,
Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period 1953-1960, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 623,

827, 892 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Kramer & Marcuse]. Two sets of recent Senate
hearings contain complete data relative to the latest invocations of executive privilege.
See Hearings on Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the Executive
Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 310-314, 543-551, 629-636 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
1971 Hearings]; Hearings on Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Government, Freedom of
Information Before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Operations and the Subcommittees on Separation of
Powers and Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee of the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 219-228, 229-259 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973
Hearings].
7See BERGER, supra note 3, at 254-255. See also A. C. BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECuTIVE
PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER INFORMATION 143-150 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as BRECKENRIDGE].
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concludes that there were no executive limits placed on the power of
legislative investigation, resulting in a "virtually untrammeled" power
of inquiry. While some question has been raised as to the value of such
precedents in defining Congress' legislative power, since the Parliament was
8
in part a judicial as well as legislative body, C. S. Potts seemed to have
resolved the issue 'by demonstrating that the House of Commons was
9
"fundamentally and essentially a legislative, and not a judicial body."
Berger moves on to an examination of colonial and early state
materials bearing upon legislative investigation. Although there was no
role for impeachment during the colonial period when governors were
chosen by royal appointment, there was nevertheless no shortage of
investigations into the administration of the government or general
0
matters of legislative concern.' When the revolution broke out and the
new state constitutions were drafted, the previous colonial obstruction to
impeachment was removed. Each lower house in all the new states was
vested with the power of impeachment and, by inference, with the
authority to investigate the conduct of government." The Continental
Congress itself provided, in creating a department of foreign affairs, that
a member of Congress could have access to any papers of that office,
with even secret documents being available for examination upon
special leave of Congress.
Berger devotes meticulous attention to the constitutional convention
and the first Congress, where impeachment was carried over in its full
dimensions. Decidedly the drafters wanted to make the President and his
subordinates accountable to Congress for the conduct of their offices. Free
flow of information to Congress was further encouraged by the mandatory
provision for the state of the union address. The first Congress, peopled
with many of those who had participated in the drafting of the
Constitution, specified that the treasury department should provide any
information upon request of Congress without mention of any executive
discretion to withhold documents. This early recognition of unhindered
investigative power seems 'borne out by the history of such congressional
investigations throughout the next century. While there are occasional
refusals to provide information, the overwhelming pattern was congres12
sional seeking and securing of all information desired. The necessity for
8See Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 183-185 (1880). On this case, see generally
Morgan, Congressional Investigations and Judicial Review: Kilbourn v. Thompson
Revisited, 37 CALin. L. REV. 556 (1949).
9 Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 691,

696 (1926).
10 Potts reaches similar conclusions based upon his investigations. Id. at 708.
n See the significant research undertaken by Landis, ConstitutionalLimitations on the

Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARv. L. REV. 153, 167-168 (1926). Landis
states that prior to 1880, no state decision curtailed or even limited state legislative
investigative power.
12

This is clearly the conclusion of Landis after an exhaustive study that covered the
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Congress to have unlimited access to information essential for the making
of new laws, for the evaluation of existing statutes, for the appropriation of
funds, and for the insurance of administrative and executive accountability,
was almost universally recognized. 3
If there seems to be such widespread recognition of the legitimacy of
and necessity for congressional investigations, why then has there evolved
something called "executive privilege"? The answer lies in the nature of
the separation of powers structure created by the Constitution. 4 As
Breckenridge has asserted: "The executive power resides in the president
and is not subordinate to the legislative power vested in Congress."' 5 In
short, Congress cannot utilize its power to investigate in such a fashion as
will diminish the President's abilities to discharge his own constitutional
obligations. The acceptance of this proposition demands a demonstration
that the President has certain exclusive constitutional powers which will
not tolerate legislative interference. The usual powers said to belong in
this category are the "executive power," the power as commander-in-chief,
and the exclusive executive power over foreign relations. Berger devotes
individual chapters to each of these powers with the purpose of showing
that far from being the exclusive preserve of the Presidency, they in fact
involve a sharing of power with Congress. As a result, Congress then has
every justification in seeking information relative to their discharge. In
addition to this, it seems evident to this reviewer that Berger also has the
unstated goal of seeking to cut the modern presidency down to size by
refuting three of the major legal supports instrumental in the evolution
of today's potent presidential office.
In dealing with each of these three elements of presidential power,
Berger's methodology is identical. Relying upon exhaustive analysis of
historical materials, he seeks to demonstrate that the constitutional
dimensions of each executive power have been expanded beyond the
original intent of the framers. Consequently, the "executive power"
period through 1924. See also Stamps, The Power of Congress to Inquire and Punish
for Contempt, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 29, 39-40 (1951).
13 See generally E. EBERLING, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (1928) [hereinafter
cited as EBERLINGI; M. DIMocK, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING COMMITEES (1929);
M. N. MCGEARY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE POWER (1940)
[hereinafter cited as McGEARY]; Galloway, The Investigative Function of Congress,21
AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 47, 49-50 (1927). Interestingly enough, Eberling still asserts
that the President is justified in resisting any demand for information he considers
incompatible with the public interest, EBERLING, supra, at 282, while McGeary considers the issue to be "an open question," McGEARY, supra, at 103-04.
14 For effective analysis of the separation of powers concept see R. SCIGLIANO, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 1-22 (1971); A. VANDERBILT, THE DOcRmINE
OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1963); Sharp,

The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 CI. L. REV. 385
(1935).
15 BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 7, at 24 (1974). See also Younger, Congressional Investigations and Executive Secrecy: A Study in the Separationof Powers, 20 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 755, 771 (1959).
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clause 16 is not a grant of ill-defined presidential authority meant to expand
over time, but rather it is limited to the precise elements (commander-inchief, veto, power to negotiate treaties, etc.) specified in section 2 of
Article II. Berger asserts that the framers were so terrified of unbridled
executive power that they certainly would not have inserted such a
blank check into an otherwise precise delineation of executive power.
There simply are no inherent presidential powers.
Relative to the commander-in-chief clause, Berger concludes that the
President is merely to direct troops in response to congressional policy,
with the only exception being the ability to repel sudden and immediate
attacks upon the United States itself. The powers granted to Congress in
terms of declaring war, raising and governing armies, and appropriating
money all indicate shared responsibility. Hence, Berger concludes that
Lincoln's creation of the "war power," by merging the commander-in-chief
clause with the requirement that the President "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed," was illegitimate.
Finally, in reference to presidential power in foreign relations, it
is asserted that the President was not meant to be the "exclusive
organ" of the nation. The executive was only to negotiate agreements
17
which required ultimate Senate approval. The President's authority
was not designed to be monopolistic, thus the entire evolution of
executive agreements is, aside from those implementing express policy
from Congress, constitutionally incorrect.
It is at this point that Berger's attack upon executive privilege begins
to falter. Has Berger adequately explained the growth of presidential
power by demonstrating that the office has evolved over several centuries
and grown in response to the demands placed upon it? In answering,
consideration must be given -to whether Berger's interpretation of the
available historical materials is as "air-tight" as he would lead us to believe.
Berger's basic premise is that such intense suspicion of executive
power existed after the revolution that the Presidency was meant to be
carefully hedged in, relative to its powers, with no potential for expansion
beyond the express components found in the Constitution. Strangely,
Berger seems to have forgotten some of his own previous historical
analysis. In 1969, he wrote that "in 1787 there was widespread fear
of oppression by a remote federal government, centered largely in dread of
'legislative despotism.' "18 In that earlier book, Berger correctly related
how the activities of the tyrannical state legislatures (particularly in
16 "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of

America," U.S. CONSr. art. II, § 1.
17 Berger meticulously analyzes and rejects the reasoning in the key decision of United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In addition, his analysis
of the executive agreement doctrine contributes a valuable perspective to the sparse
literature on this topic. BERGER, supra note 3, at 140-62.
18 R. BEROER, CONGRESS V. TIM SUPRuME COURT 8 (1969).
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reference to their populistic attacks upon property rights) had made the
framers determined to keep congressional power within precise limits, and
one device designed to accomplish this was a strong President. 9
Pertaining to the executive power clause, there is considerable
disagreement. Charles Warren, while agreeing in part with Berger that the
authority was to be limited to the specific powers stated in section 2, goes
beyond Berger's position by adding "or as might be implied from each
such specific power."' 20 Another definitive work on the creation of the
Presidency concludes that it cannot be definitely settled as to whether
the intent was to expressly hold the Presidency to those powers stated
in the original draft of the clause.21 But the final version which emerged
from a committee on style dominated by pro-executive power advocate
Gouverneur Morris, was clearly unlike the legislative and judicial articles
in simply vesting the "executive power" without any specification of its
components. This was probably deliberately done in the hope of
encouraging the future growth of executive power. 22 The definitive
Library of Congress annotated Constitution further supports the expansive
concept of Presidential power.23 This interpretation of the clause also
seems consistent with the manner of draftsmanship used throughout the
Constitution: "a general proposition followed by an incomplete enumeration of particulars, or things which, arguably, are particulars, included
within the antecedent general expression. ' 24 But what many writers find
most significant is the long line of definitive Supreme Court decisions
which have so augmented Presidential powers-'3
19 Id. at 11. The abuses of state legislative power are effectively discussed in J. FIsKE,
THE CRITICAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY 200-220 (1902).
20 C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 526 (1967).
21 C. THATCH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 117-118 (1922).
22 Id. at 138. It is surprising that Berger makes no reference to Thatch's significant

volume in his bibliography.
23
The difficulty of a complete enumeration of all the cases of executive authority,
would naturally dictate the use of general terms, and would render it improbable
that a specification of certain particulars was designed as a substitute for those
terms, when antecedently used. The different mode of expression employed in
the constitution, in regard to the two powers, the legislative and the executive,

serves to confirm this inference. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 427 (N. Small ed. 1964).

24 W. W. CROSSKEY, I POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 379 (1953) [hereinafter cited
as CROSSKEY]. This writer is indebted to C. H. PnrrcHETr, Tan AMERICAN CONSTrruTION 334 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as PRITCHETT], for suggesting the above
reference by Crosskey.
25See generally G. SCHUBERT, THE PRESIDENCY IN THE COURTS (1957); E. S. CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS (4th ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as CORWIN].
Relative to military leadership see C. ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF (1951). On foreign policy, consult L. HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37-65 (1972). The major exception to this tendency

of broad augmentation of presidential powers is found in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). But this unique decision does not refute the
correctness of the general expansive reading of executive power. "What the decision
did hold was that the inherent power of seizure which the President might otherwise
have possessed had been eliminated in this situation when Congress decided not to
include seizure authority in the Taft-Hartley Act." PRITCHETT at 341. See also on the
case A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY O '

CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW CASE (1958).
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Even if Berger's interpretation of constitutional history were correct,
would this settle the issue? The answer seems to hinge upon one's theory
of constitutional construction. "I am," Berger related in Senate testimony,
"an adherent of the historical meaning of constitutional terms... I prefer
to see the intention of the Founding Fathers. ' 26 That is, what the framers
intended to mean by certain terms should forever determine their
subsequent content. This philosophy of historical intent was significantly
employed in the massive 1952 study published by W. W. Crosskey.27 His
1200 pages of analysis were devoted to demonstrating the correct meanings
to be applied to basic constitutional terms ("commerce," "in pursuance
thereof," "executive power") in light of their meanings in 1787. Crosskey
argued that much subsequent interpretation had gone astray because of
ignorance of what key constitutional phrases meant to the drafters.
Berger seems to be of the same school. Yet such a theory ignores the
reality of constitutional language and intent. While it is perfectly correct
to maintain such a position for certain provisions of the document,
Berger's own massive research into impeachment well demonstrating
this, other clauses of the Constitution are of a different nature. It has been
argued that there is a "two-clause" theory of interpretation. "A two-clause
theory states that there are two distinct groups of constitutional clauses,
one immutable and not subject to judicial construction, the other subject
to change over time through judicial interpretation." 2 While there is no
definitive theory of how one can distinguish one type of clause from
another, it seems logical that in applying either the "textual approach"
(looking at the language of the text itself) or the "open-ended intent"
theory (did the framers themselves want a provision to develop and
expand), such a clause as "the executive power" clause certainly does not
suggest the fastening of a precise and permanent meaning. One need only
recall Chief Justice Marshall's famous injunction prescribing the necessity
for broad construction29 to add further doubt to the legitimacy of
Berger's theory of constrained interpretation. The Supreme Court has
persistently chosen to follow an approach requiring a broad construction
30
when interpreting Presidential power.
261971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 301.
27 See CRossKEY, supra note 24, at 3-14. Surprisingly enough, Crosskey, using the
same method of analysis, comes to the conclusion opposite of Berger's. The President
has "possession of general executive authority." CtossKEY, supra note 24, at 379. As
does Corwin, Crosskey points to the power granted by the first Congress to the
President in 1789 providing the authority for removal of executive officials (which
was not expressly granted) as indicating the correctness of this interpretation. See
CORWIN, supra note 25, at 16-17; PsrrcnHTT, supra note 24, at 334.
28C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 162 (1969).
29 "... . a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be

adapted to the various crises of human affairs." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
so This of course does not mean that history is of no value in constitutional
ponstruction.
1History thus provides 9.nlihnmnt .qdged, the Court frequently says that it
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One of the most persistent arguments put forward by those supporting
executive privilege is past precedent.31 The most frequently cited source
of such precedents is found in a 1957 memorandum prepared by then
Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers.3 2 Berger devotes one chapter
to an effort to repudiate the precedent value of some of these instances.
Berger discusses only a handful of these purported precedents, preferring
to concentrate his analysis on the incidents occurring before the Civil War.
In so doing he is really attempting to discredit the two key propositions
announced at the beginning of the Rogers memo. Those propositions are:
first, that a persistent line of precedents exists over 150 years, demonstrating the widespread acceptance of the practice; and second, that the
courts have uniformly upheld such power on the part of the President and
his subordinates. While Berger and others have demonstrated that both
of these propositions are palpably incorrect,3 4 it is, nevertheless, beyond
doubt that consistently throughout American history Presidents have
asserted the power and have been successful in their assertion. This has
resulted for a number of reasons: in almost every case Congress has gotten
what it asked for; Congress has avoided any court test (until the recent
Watergate committee) seeking to force the Executive to produce certain
documents, and Congress' ample powers over appropriations, confirmation
of appointments, and so forth, have generally been effectively utilized
to compel action on the part of recalcitrant executives. Nonetheless,
Congress' unwillingness to initiate a court test of its power, and its
preference for seeking a "political" solution, have promoted the successful
assertion of executive privilege.
Berger employs several techniques in examining the precedents which
he discusses. The primary tactic is to demonstrate, through his superb
skills of historical analysis, that key precedents have turned on facts other
than those cited by the supporters of executive privilege (e.g., the
reads the provisions of the Constitution "in the light of" history. The image of
light suggests most clearly how history should be used. It is neither prologue on
the one hand, nor director of the drama on the other; rather, history is a
spotlight,
available
to illumine,
to blind.
provide
the
answersalways
to the
problems
of today;but
it not
merely
helps History
to framedoes
thenotquestions.
Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31
U. Cm. L. REy. 502, 552-553 (1964). See also Wyzanski, History and Law, 26
U. CHI. L. REv. 237 (1959).

slSee generally sources cited in note 6, supra. For an example of this argument see
Note, The Power of the Executive to Withhold Information from Congressional
Investigating Committees, 43 Gao.
643, H.
646-653 (1955).
32

MEMORANDUMS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO
WITHHOLD INFORMATION FROM CONGRESS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUICIARy, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.

942 (1958) [hereinafter cited as ROGER'S MEMO]. See also Rogers, Constitutional Law:

The Papers of the Executive Branch, 44 A.B.A.J. 941 (1958); Wolkinson, supra note
6. But see response by Schwartz, A Reply to Mr. Rogers: The Papers of the Executive

Branch, 45 A.B.AJ. 467 (1959).
3S3ROGER'S MEMO, supranote 32, at 942.

4 See 197) Hearings, supra note 6, at 247; Schwartz, Executive Privilege and
Conressipnal InvEstigatory Power, 47 CALW, L. REv. 3, 27-32 (1959).
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investigation of General St. Clair and the Burr conspiracy trial).3 His
secondary technique, which is less valuable, is simply to argue that while
such a claim of executive privilege was in fact made, it was constitutionally
invalid. Berger would have been better advised to have just conceded that
such episodes had taken place in the past, and then to have explained how
Congress was reluctant to invoke judicial power and how it sought instead
to achieve an acceptable political solution to the problem. It is also equally
evident from the historical record that when Presidents have successfully
asserted the power, Congress has seldom stated its acquiescence in the
legitimacy of the practice. In fact, until 1904, Congress itself often
as evidence of the
granted the very dispensations that are now cited
3
inherent executive power to withhold information.
There is no ambiguity, however, pertaining to the asserted court
precedents upholding executive privilege relating to congressional requests
for information. None exist. Berger effectively discusses this in a chapter
on "Executive Privilege Compared with Evidentiary Privilege." Courts
have recognized the authority of the executive to withhold secret
information (usually of military value) from private litigants in civil
37
suits. The definitive case is United States v. Reynolds, which involved
a suit brought by wives of civilian employees killed during the crash of a
military aircraft. The widows wanted certain documentary reports
pertaining to the crash, but the military argued that to comply with this
request would entail the disclosure of military secrets. The Supreme Court
sustained the government position, holding that the Federal Tort Claims
Act did not waive normal executive control over privileged documents.
Further, it was not necessary for the government to disclose such material
to trial judges for in camera inspection, as long as the trial judge had
reasonable cause to believe that injurious disclosure would result from
making such information available. This situation is wholly different from
congressional requests for executive information.
Another of the purported precedents is Environmental Protection
Agency v. Mink,38 wherein the Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the
government to disclose documents relating to underground nuclear testing.
Not only does this case again involve private litigants (albeit Mink was a
35 Berger has continued to defend his interpretation of the Burr trial. See his
decimation of Rhodes, What Really Happened to the Jefferson Subpoenas? 60

A.B.A.J. 52 (1974), in Berger, The President, Congress and the Courts, 83 YALE L.J.
1111, 1111-1122 (1974).
3
6See 1971 Hearings, supra note 6, at 247.
37345 U.S. 1 (1952). The recent cases on the Nixon tapes involve questions of the
courts as agents in the criminal justice process and not private litigants. These will be
discussed infra.

38410 U.S. 73 (1973). This case is cited in BRECKINRIDGE,
recognizing executive privilege. This is based on the use
privilege" by several of the Justices. However, this was done
no issue of executive privilege was involved in the case. See
J., concurring).
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member of Congress), but the decision of the Court also turned on provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and not on any general considerations of executive privilege. It is beyond dispute that the courts have
limited judicial access to certain executive information, particularly under
the doctrines of military and foreign policy secrecy, informers, and confidential information. 39 However, the cases limiting judicial access should
not be read as precedent for limiting congressional access. There is a great
contrast between the judiciary's and the Congress' need for information.
Having thoroughly examined the legal and historical justifications
suggested by supporters of executive privilege, Berger rounds out his
analysis with a discussion of the "practical arguments" made in support
of the concept. Primary among the arguments is the "candid interchange
doctrine," which asserts that unless a President can guarantee the privacy
of his intra-executive branch communications, he will not receive from
his subordinates the candid types of advice and arguments which are
essential for effective policymaking. Berger's response is to point out that
this practice was not considered necessary until President Eisenhower first
asserted this position in 1954. 40 Furthermore, Berger argues that it would
often be difficult for Congress to attach responsibility for decisions if it
were not able to follow the flow of policymaking, including the inputs of
candid recommendations from executive advisors. That such stripping
away of confidentiality may result in embarrassment is incidental. Ought
not presidential advisors be responsible for their exercises of judgment?
Interestingly enough, this "housekeeping" privilege has attracted influential
support from Dorsen and Shattuck in an article otherwise extremely critical
of executive privilege. 4 ' Basing their position on the need to encourage
candid interchange of opinion within the executive branch, they would
nonetheless still require executive officials to testify as to what decisions
were actually made, if not the recommendations and considerations that
shaped that decision. The American Civil Liberties Union has even produced a series of guidelines to suggest how such delicate situations ought to
be managed. 42 These proposals are certainly deserving of serious evaluation.
Another slate of practical arguments has been suggested by Bishop
in an influential 1957 article discussed by Berger. 43 A very important
consideration is whether Congress could be a safe repository of secret
information. This is a position asserted frequently by executive privilege
supporters seeking to identify the concept of executive disclosure to
39 See generally Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE LJ. 879
(1962); Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L.
REv. 166 (1958).
4
oSee notes 4-5, supra, and accompanying text.
41 Dorsen & Shattuck, Executive Privilege, the Congress and the Courts, 35 OHIO ST.
LJ. 1, 29-33 (1974).

42d. at 30-33.
43 Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question,
66 YaLE LJ. 477 (1957).
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Congress with the concept of automatic public disclosure.44 This position

serves as a strategy to avoid having to deal candidly with the primary issue
of congressional disclosure. The fact that congressional committees have
persistently involved themselves in overseeing military affairs, the CIA,
and other confidential matters, without any more leaks resulting than those
45
originating in executive agencies, largely refutes this argument. Another
contention, which is less easy to dismiss, involves keeping the information
derogatory of individual reputations within the privacy of executive files.
In the late 1940's a mammoth flare-up developed from demands for raw
4
FBI files, which resulted in a claim of executive privilege. " Again, this
issue is one of confidence in congressional rectitude, but in all fairness it
should also be recognized that since considerations of national security
are not involved here, members of Congress would probably feel less
restrained in leaking information. After all, "exposure for exposure's
sake" has frequently been an unstated goal of congressional investigations.
To these, and other less significant practical arguments, Berger responds
by stating that the President was meant to function in open view within
a "goldfish bowl" environment. This is a proposition to which some
parameters must be attached in order for it to be meaningful.
Berger calls for authoritative judicial resolution of the executive
privilege issue in the concluding sections of the volume. Although the
4
Supreme Court's action in the recent case of United States v. Nixon
indicates the courts will entertain suits on at least some executive privilege
questions, it must be emphasized that the Nixon situation involved
considerations of the needs of the judicial branch engaged in a criminal
trial. There are still vital, unanswered questions pertaining to jurisdiction
in situations where a suit would involve a congressional committee
seeking such information. 48 Berger's discussion of these issues is well
worth serious examination.
The first likely obstacle is the doctrine of case and controversy. Does
441971 Hearings,supra note 6, at 243.
45See

Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The decision indicates that

severe criminal penalties may attach to members of Congress who release classified
information.
46 Collins, The Power of Congressional Committees of Investigation to Obtain
Information from the Executive Branch: The Argument for the Legislative Branch,
39 GEo. L.J. 563, 577 (1951).
94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974). For a complete discussion of the case and its
47 ...... U.S .......
ramifications, see generally Symposium: United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
4 (1974). Prior to the Nixon opinion, the controlling decision was Nixon v. Sirica,
487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cit. 1973). Berger has analyzed both the majority and dissenting
opinions in the latter case in the "Epilogue" chapter of his book. See BERGER, supra
note 3, at 348-72.
4
BSee Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366
F. Supp. 51 (1973), (Judge Sirica's opinion refusing jurisdiction in the case involving
the Senate Watergate Committee's efforts to enforce their subpoena against President
Nixon.) Additional problems may result if a committee seeks information also
involved in a prominent criminal trial. See Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521 (1974).
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a suit between two branches of the federal government really involve
sufficient conflict of interest to justify resolution of the dispute by the
courts? Berger argues that it is the nature of the dispute, not who brings
it, that should be determinative, whether the dispute exists between
branches of the government or merely within a single branch.49 This
position is certainly in accordance with the need to have a mechanism
available to resolve inter-branch conflicts according to law. Even an
opponent of general judicial review such as Judge Learned Hand clearly
stated his belief that the courts were required to intervene in suits wherein
issues of the boundaries of power between branches were involved.50
Obviously such considerations also relate to standing, a second possible
obstacle, for who has a better argument for standing than a Congress
which is trying to protect its constitutional prerogatives?
In his previous volume on impeachment, Berger indicated he had
concluded that the doctrine of political questions was in a period of
flux, and that the courts would probably intervene further in areas
previously considered to be immune from judicial action by this doctrine. 5'
The key decisions in this regard were Powell v. McCormack5M (involving
congressional power to expel one of its own members) and Baker v.
Carr (reapportionment suits are justiciable). In the latter case, the
Court spelled out the criteria that would determine whether the Court
would consider an issue to be capable of judicial resolution." It was
emphasized that the Court must have the appropriate criteria for judgment
and recourse to an appropriate remedy. Berger argues that the issue of
executive privilege satisfies both of these criteria. 55 In addition, any serious
conflict between the branches is so significant that it must be resolved.
Berger makes so convincing an argument, particularly when read in
conjunction with United States v. Nixon, that courts should find little
problem in establishing their jurisdiction to decide such a case should it
arise. Both as a matter of law and as a matter of practical necessity in
49 This point was shown to be correct in the Nixon case, where the Supreme Court
held that the Special Prosecutor's dispute with the President, even though he was
technically a member of the executive branch, was "the kind of controversy courts
traditionally resolve." ....
U.S. at .94
S. Ct. at 3102.
50 "The courts were undoubtedly the best 'Department' in which to vest such a power,
since by the independence of their tenure they were least likely to be influenced by
diverting pressure." L. HAND,THE BILL OF RIGHrTS 29 (1965).
51 R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 103-121 (1972). See
also B. STRUM, TaE SUPREME COURT AND "POLITICAL QUESTIONS": A STUDY IN
JUDICIAL EvAsioN (1974).
52 395 U.S. 486 (1969). See K. WEEKS, ADAM CLAYTON POWELL AND THE SUPREME
COURT (1971); P. DIONISOPouLos, REBELLION, RACISM, AND REPRESENTATION: THE
ADAM CLAYTON POWELL CASE AND ITS ANTECEDENTS (1970).

53 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
54Id. at 217.
55
In the Nixon case, the Court indicated this assumption was correct, at least in a
suit involving information sought for a criminal prosecution. See ....
U.S .....
93 S.Ct.
at 3100-03.
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a separation of powers system, the courts would not be justified in seeking
to avoid a ruling if such a case should materialize.
Berger's express purpose in producing this volume was to demonstrate
that executive privilege was a constitutional "myth," deserving of no
support. While he has failed in that goal, his approach to the issue, his
framing of the important elements of analysis, and his amassing of
historical evidence have provided an invaluable framework for analyzing
the issue. This will become increasingly important in the future, for it
seems likely that the courts will be called upon to balance the competing
claims for constitutional power between executive privilege and congressional demands for information. This certainly seems to be the message
of United States v. Nixon, which was unanimously decided in July of
1974. What the Court attempted to do in Nixon was to balance an
apparently legitimate general interest of the Presidency in maintaining
privileged information, with the special needs of the judicial process which
was engaged in the trial of a criminal case which demanded those
56
materials as crucial pieces of evidence. This is precisely the kind of
balancing the Court engaged in during the 1950's and 1960's in relation
to congressional demands for information which conflicted with the
57
privacy rights of individuals and groups. "Since the courts can determine
only the concrete case before them," as Kramer and Marcuse have
acknowledged, "a single opinion cannot decide the broad problem of
58
executive privilege in all its ramifications." Nonetheless, some suggestive
conclusions seem in order, based upon the Nixon opinion.
The first point that strikes a reader of the decision is that the
Supreme Court simply assumes the existence and legitimacy of executive
privilege as a general policy. In other words, there is a presumption that
executive privilege usually ought to be sustained. The second point is
that the general presumption can (like the general presumption behind
the absolute nature of the first amendment) be overborne on occasion, if
a competing interest of greater public importance can be demonstrated. In
short, executive privilege is qualified. In the Nixon case, it was the necessity
for the judiciary to be able to function in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities that overrode the President's claim of privilege. The Court
suggests, however, that the cases in which the legitimacy of executive
privilege is overborne will be so infrequent as not to undermine the
confidentiality of the executive branch. Since the Court framed the Nixon
issue in terms of the needs of the judicial branch to- discharge its
constitutional responsibilities, it is likely that Congress will have to estab5

6"In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of presidential communication in performance of his responsibilities against the
U.S. at
inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice." ....
.... , 94 S. Ct. at 3109.

57 These developments are discussed in Clark, ConstitutionalSources of the Penumbral
Right to Privacy, 19 VILL. L. REv.833 (1974).

08 Kramer & Marcuse, supra note 6, at 904.
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lish, to the satisfaction of the judiciary, the absolute indispensability of the
information which Congress seeks in order to perform its own constitutional obligations. This may prove to be a very heavy burden indeed.
What seems to lie ahead is further detailing by the courts of
the proper boundaries between the executive power to withhold and the
congressional authority to demand certain types of information. Even
though the Supreme Court has previously evaluated claims for legislative
investigatory power in relation to the legislative need, to its pertinency,
and to civil liberties, 59 the Court will now have to draw further lines
relating to the limits imposed upon the investigatory power of Congress
when it is met by the Presidency's need for confidentiality. This is why
Berger's analysis, though in this reviewer's opinion fundamentally incorrect
in its central thesis, will be invaluable for the future. The complex range
of necessary considerations which must be included within any such
judicial judgment are all addressed and analyzed within the volume. The
book itself makes it unmistakably clear that limits must be imposed upon
the invocation of executive privilege, and that the argument in support
of the practice of asserting executive privilege contains major gaps. It is
in this process of making everyone aware of the difficult considerations
surrounding the issue, particularly as to the contrasting constitutional
responsibilities and needs of the two branches, that Berger's fine book
will continue to make a major contribution.

59 For discussion of Supreme Court holdings relating to congressional investigations,
see McKay, Congressional Investigations and the Supreme Court, 51 CALIF. L. REv.
267 (1963); Alfange, Congressional Investigations and the Fickle Court, 30 U. CN.
L. REV. 113 (1961); Gose, The Limits of Congressional Investigating Power, 10
WAS#. L
61,(1935),
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